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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

HARRY KIRK CREAlviER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
THE OGDEN UNION RAILWAY
AND DEPOT COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No. 7664

PETITION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF IN
SUPPORT THEREOF

PETITION FOR REHEARING
CO:\IES now HARRY KIRK CREAMER, Plaintiff
and Respondent herein, and respectfully petitions this
Honorable Court for a rehearing in the above-entitled
case, and to vacate the Order of this Court herein reversing the judgment for respondent with instructions to dismiss.
This Petition is based on the following grounds:
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Point I.
This Court has, by its opinion herein, deprived the
plaintiff of a jury trial and has decided this case contrary to the opinions and controlling cases decided by the
Supreme Court of the United States.
Point II.
This Court has erred in deciding as a matter of law
that defendant was not negligent in furnishing "insufficient" equipment for the work of icing diners, and only
owes a duty to workmen having "no physical weakness."
Accompanying this Petition and filed herewith is a
brief in support thereof.

RAWLINGS, WALLACE, BLACK
ROBERTS & BLACK
_______________\,ja_'J-r.ll:.---~+~-\.a.~t( _________________ _
Wayne L. Black

Attorneys for PlaVn.tiff and
Respondent

I hereby certify that I am one of the attorneys for
the Respondent, Petitioner herein, and that in my opinion
there is good cause to believe the judgment objected to is
erroneous and that the case ought to be re-examined as
prayed for in said Petition.
Dated this---~~---- day of June, 1952.

____________ w_a."f_t\-e. ___ ~_(_G_la~---------------w ayne

L. Black
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RECEIYED

~ cop~f the foregoing Petition and

Brief in Support Thereof this ...L~...... day of June, 1952.

Bryan P. Leverich
M. J. Bronson
A. U. Miner
Howard F. Coray
D. A. Alsup
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR
REHEARING
Point I.
THIS COURT HAS, BY ITS OPINION HEREIN, DEPRIVED THE PLAINTIFF OF A JURY TRIAL AND HAS
DECIDED THIS CASE CONTRARY TO THE OPINIONS AND
CONTROLLING CASES DECIDED BY THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

Plaintiff, employed by defendant as a coach cleaner,
after a number of months of assignment to lighter tasks,
was ordered and directed to ice three diners. Over a
period of 2lf2 hours he carried 1lf2 tons of ice, 100 pounds
at a time, up a 15 foot ladder. The extreme overexertion
occasioned by this task caused him to suffer heart failure
and consequent permanent injury. Icing diners was the
most strenuous task in The 0. U. R. & D. yard. Some of
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

.4

the coach cleaners didn't have sufficient strength and
stamina to ice three diners. Coach cleaners coming from
a vacation or whose muscles were not hardened to the
task, experienced real difficulty icing diners until they
became conditioned to its strenuous demands. Yet, of the
many coach cleaners working in the yard, any or all were
called upon from time to time to perform this task. The
likelihood of injury from overexertion to one or more of
this class of workmen could certainly be foreseen by a
reasonably prudent employer, viewing the evidence in a
light most favorable to plaintiff.
The evidence further revealed that practical lifting
and hoisting devices were readily available and even in
use on adjacent tracks by the Pacific Fruit Express
Company.
The trial judge determined that the evidence was
sufficient to require submission to the jury of the questions of defendant's negligence and proximate cause. The
jury found that defendant \vas negligent and that said
negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.
The case was submitted to the jury on instructions unassailed here.
This Court has held that reasonable minds could not
differ upon the proposition that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict in favor of plaintiff. By this holding, the Court has deprived plaintiff of
a jury trial upon the issues of this case.
The Supreme Court of the United States in Tiller
v. Atlantic Coast LineR. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 87 L. Ed. 610,
63 S. Ct. 444, ±51, has pointed out:
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"It appears to be the clear Congressional intent that to the maxilnum extent proper, questions
in actions arising under the Act should be left to
the jury."
That. Court in a number of recent cases has carefully
guarded the right of trial by jury in cases arising under
the Federal En1ployers' Liability Act and has vigorously
upheld and given effect to the intention of Congress as
above set forth. We submit that the holding of
this Court is in conflict with the holdings in these
controlling cases and is contrary to the provisions of
said Act.
This Court has resolved facts and legitimate inferences from facts against rather than in favor of the
plaintiff. For example, the Court in its opinion stated:
"It must be conceded that without the rheumatic heart, injury would not have resulted."
We call attention to the fact that plaintiff had not
been performing this type of vigorous exercise for a
long period of time. He was assigned this task on a hot
summer day. It involved lifting a tremendous amount of
weight up a near vertical ladder. Some coach cleaners,
because of natural physical weakness, could not have
iced three diners, one following the other, even had they
tried. We deny that it must be conceded plaintiff would
not have suffered injury without the rheumatic heart.
We submit that from the legitimate inferences from
known facts the jury could well have found and did find
a likelihood of injury to any member of the class of work-
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men to which plaintiff belonged in the general nature of
the task assigned.
This Court has disregarded the admonitions of the
United States Supreme Court in the case of Tennant v.
Peoria & Pekin Union Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 64 S. Ct. 409,
412, 88 L. Ed. 520, where the court stated:

"It is not the function of a court to search the
record for conflicting circumstantial evidence in
order to take the case away from the jury on a
theory that the proof gives equal support to inconsistent and uncertain inferences. The focal point
of judicial review is the reasonableness of the
particular inference or conclusion, drawn by the
jury. It is the jury, not the court, which is the factfinding body. It weighs the contradictory evidence
and inferences, judges the credibility of witnesses,
receives expert instructions, and draws the ultimate conclusion as to the facts. The very essence of its function is to select from among conflicting inferences and conclusions that which it
considers most reasonable. * * * That conclusion,
whether it relates to negligence, causation or any
other factual matter, cannot be ignored. Courts
are not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside
the jury verdict 1nerely because the jury could
have drawn different inferences or conclusions
or because judges feel that other results are more
reasonable.
''Upon an examination of the record we cannot say that the inference drawn by this jury that
respondent's negligence caused the fatal accident
is without support in the evidence. Thus to enter
a judg1nent for respondent notwithstanding the
verdict is to deprive petitioner of the right to a
jury trial. No reason is apparent why we should
abdicate our duty to protect and guard that right
in this case."
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In the TilleT case, supra, the court stated (63 S. Ct.
44-!, 451) :
·· * * * :Many years ago this Court said of the
problen1s of negligence, '\Ye see no reason, so long
as the jury systen1 is the law of the land, and the
jury is n1ade the tribunal to decide disputed
questions of fact, why it should not decide such
questions as these as well as others.' Jones v.
East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co., 128 U.S. 443, 445,
9 S. Ct. 118, 32 L. Ed. 478, 479. Or as we have
put it on another occasion, 'Where the facts are
in dispute, and the evidence in relation to them
is that from which fair-minded men may draw different inferences,' the case should go to the jury."

In Bailey v. Central r ermont Ry. Inc., 319 U.S. 350,
63 S. Ct. 1062, 1064, 87 L. Ed. 1444, the court stated:
"The right to trial by jury is 'a basic and
fundamental feature of our system of federal jurisprudence.' ~Jacob v. New York City, 315 U.S.
752, 62 S. Ct. 854, 86 L. Ed. 1166. It is part and
parcel of the remedy afforded railroad workers
under the Employers' Liability Act. Reasonable
care and cause and effect are as elusive here as in
other fields. But the jury has been chosen as the
appropriate tribunal to apply those standards to
the facts of these personal injuries. That method
of determining the liability of the carriers and of
placing on them the cost of these industrial accidents may be crude, archaic, and expensive as compared with the more modern systems of workmen's
compensation. But however inefficient and backward it may be, it is the system which Congress
has provided. To deprive these workers of the
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benefit of a jury trial in close or doubtful cases is
to take away a goodly portion of the relief which
Congress has afforded them."
A recent case of the Eighth Circuit Court concisely
states the gist of these Supreme Court decisions. Terminal R. Ass'n. of St. Louis v. Schorb, 151 F. 2d 361:

"'" * * One of the main purposes of the Federal Employers' Liability Act was to modify the
common law barriers against recovery by an employee in a suit against his employer predicated
on an industrial accident. Tiller, Executor, v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 63 S. Ct.
444, 87 L. Ed. 610, 143 A.L.R. 967. The right to
jury trial constitutes a part of the remedy afforded by the act and employees must not be deprived
of that right in close or doubtful cases. Bailey,
Administratrix, v. Central Vermont Ry. Inc., 319
U.S. 350 loc. cit. 354, 63 S. Ct. 1062, 87 L. Ed. 1444.
It was for the jury, as the fact finding body, to
weigh the evidence and judge credibility. Tennant,
Administratrix, v. Peoria & P. U. Ry. Co., 321
U.S. 29, 64 S. Ct. 409, 88 L. Ed. 520; Crain v. Illinois Central R. Co., 335 Mo. 658, 73 S..W. (2d) 786,
certiorari denied, 293 U.S. 607, 55 S. Ct. 123, 79
L. Ed. 698. On this appeal we must view the evidence and inferences reasonably to be drawn
therefrom, in the light most favorable to plaintiff.
Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. R. Co., v. Muldowney,
8 Cir., 130 F. (2d) 971, certiorari denied, 317 U.S.
700, 63 S. Ct. 526, 87 L. Ed. 560."
In Wilkerson v. McCarthy et al., 336 U.S. 53, 69 S.
Ct. 413, 421, 93 L. Ed. 1098, reversing the Utah Supreme
Court, 112 Utah 300, 187 P. 2d 188, Mr. Justice Douglas,
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discussing the stewardship of F·. E. L.A. cases by the
United States Supren1e Court, stated:
'"The basis of liability under the Act is and
remains negligence. Judges will not always agree
as to what facts are necessary to establish negligence. \Ye are not in agreement in all cases. But
the review of the cases coming to the Court from
the 1943 Tenn to date and set forth in the Appendix to this opinion shows, I think, a record more
faithful to the design of the Act than previously
prevailed.
"Of the 55 petitions for certiorari filed during
this period, 20 have been granted. Of these one
was granted at the instance of the employer, 19 at
the instance of an employee. In 16 of these cases
the lower court was reversed for setting aside a
jury verdict for an employee or taking the case
from the jury. In 3 the lo . .ver court was sustained
in taking the case from the jury. In the one case
granted at the instance of the employer we held
that it had received the jury trial on contributory
negligence to which it was entitled. In these 20
cases we were unanimous in 10 of the decisions
which we rendered on the merits.
"Of the 35 petitions denied, 21 were by employers claiming that jury verdicts were erroneous or that new trials should not have been ordered. The remaining 14 were filed by employees.
In 10 of these the lower court had withheld the
case from the jury and rendered judgment for the
employer, in 3 it had sustained jury verdicts for
the employer and in 1 reversed a jury verdict for
the employee and directed a new trial.
"From this group of cases three observations
can be n1ade :
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" ( 1) The basis of liability has not been
shifted from negligence to absolute liability.
"(2) The criterion governing the exercise of
our discretion in granting or denying certiorari is
not who loses below but whether the jury function
in passing on disputed questions of fact and in
drawing inferences from proven facts has been
respected.
"(3) The historic role of the jury in performing that function, see Jones v. East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co., 128 U.S. 443, 445, 9 S. Ct. 118,
32 L. Ed. 478; Washington & G. R. Co. v. McDade,
135 U.S. 554, 572, 10 S. Ct. 1044, 1049, 1050, 34 L.
Ed. 235; Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry., supra,
is being restored in this important class of cases."
We submit that in the case at bar this Court has abdicated its duty to guard and protect the right of plaintiff.
to a jury trial. The approach by the Court to this case
is contrary to the spirit of the foregoing cases. The evidence has been viewed in a light more favorable to the defendant than is justified. Inferences, some not founded
on evidence, have been drawn in favor of defendant's
case and against the jury's verdict. We will attempt to
point these out with particularity in the following point:
Point II.
THIS COURT HAS ERRED IN DECIDING AS A MATTER
OF LAW THAT DEFENDANT WAS NOT NEGLIGENT IN
FURNISHING "INSUFFICIENT" EQUIPMENT FOR THE
WORK OF ICING DINERS, AND ONLY OWES A DUTY TO
WORKMEN HAVING "NO PHYSICAL WEAKNESS."

Applying the rules set forth in Point I herein, and
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viewing the evidence and the inferences deducible therefrom in a light most favorable to plaintiff, let us consider this Court's opinion.
This Court has decided as matter of law that defendant has violated "no legal duty." It has neither admitted
nor denied existence of a duty owed by defendant of furnishing coach cleaners with equipment and machinery
sufficient for icing diners with safety, but the effect of
its opinion is a holding that defendant owes no such duty.
Consider for a moment the remarkable precariousness of
this position. If no such duty exists, what is the meaning of the word "sufficient~" How can it be defined in
such a manner as to eliminate defendant's duty to plaintiff and its other employees~ Perhaps we should again
consider the purpose of the Federal Employers' Liability
Act as defined in the Wilkerson case, supra; at p. 420:

"* * * The purpose of the Act was to change
that strict rule of liability, to lift from employees
the 'prodigious burden' of personal injuries which
that system had placed upon them, and to relieve
men 'who by the exigencies and necessities of life
are bound to labor' from the risks and hazards
that could be avoided or lessened 'by the exercise
of proper care on the part of the e1nployer in providing safe and proper machinery and equipment
with which the employee does his work.'
"That purpose was not given a friendly reception in the courts. In the first place, a great
maze of restrictive interpretations were engrafted
on the Act, constructions that deprived the beneficiaries of many of the intended benefits of the
legislation. See Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Horton,
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233 U.S. 492, 34 S. Ct. 635, 58 L. Ed. 1062, L.R.A.
1915C, 1, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 475; Toledo, St. L. &
W. R. Co. v. Allen, 276 U.S. 165, 48 S. Ct. 215, 72
L. Ed. 513 ; and the review of the cases in Tiller
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 62-67,
63 S. Ct. 444, 448-451, 87 L. Ed. 610, 143 A.L.R.
967. In the second place, doubtful questions of
fact were taken from the jury and resolved by the
courts in favor of the employer. This Court led
the way in overturning jury verdicts rendered for
employees. S.ee Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v.
Coogan, 271 U.S. 472,46 S. Ct. 564,70 L. Ed.1041;
Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Aeby, 275 U.S. 426, 48 S.
Ct. 177, 72 L. Ed. 351; New York Central R. Co.
v. Ambrose, 280 U.S. 486, 50S. Ct. 198, 74 L. Ed.
562. And so it was that a goodly portion of the
relief which Congress had provided employees
was withheld from them.
"The first of these obstacles which the courts
had created could be removed by Congress. In
1939 Congress did indeed move to release the employees from the burden of assumption of risk
which the Court had rein1posed on them. 53 Stat.
1404, 45 U.S. C. Sec. 54, 45 U.S.C.A. Sec. 54; Tiller
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., supra. The second
evil was not so readily susceptible of Congressional correction under a system where liability is bottomed on negligence. Since the condition was one
created by the Court and beyond effective control
by Congress, it was appropriate and fitting that
the Court correct it. In fact, a decision not to
correct it was to let the administration of this law
be governed not by the aim of the legislation to
safeguard employees but by a hostile philosophy
that permeated its interpretation."
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'Ye submit that the duty owed by defendant was a
broad duty in keeping with the purposes of the act as outlined in the TVilke rson case, supra, and was owed not
only to workmen who had "no physical weakness," but
was owed to each and eyery member of the class of workmen perfonning the task of icing diners. It was owed to
the strong, the weak, the old and the young alike. This
was a duty owed to a class of workmen as such. It's violation would depend on whether the class as a whole,
and not just a part of the class, is protected, on whether
there was a foreseeable likelihood of injury to any member of the class, not just to plaintiff, and not just to
"normal" or "ordinary" members of the class.
If the foregoing propositions be not true, a large segment of workmen who fall below the normalcy class are
precluded from the protection of the law.
Defendant has claimed there was no breach of duty
because plaintiff had an undiscoverable physical eccentricity, but has failed to point out wherein plaintiff's
physical condition has a bearing on defendant's duty and
breach of duty. If defendant owed a duty to furnish sufficient equipment for safety in icing diners and did not
furnish such equipment, how can we escape the conclusion
that defendant was negligent~ Under what stretch of the
imagination does plaintiff's physical condition have a
bearing on safety or unsafety to coach cleaners from insufficient equipment f
This Court has held as a matter of law that there
was no likelihood of injury frorn overexertion to any
substantial number of coach cleaners assigned the task
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of icing diners by hand rather than by use of machinery,
and has thereby again fallen into the error of judicially
deciding a purely fact question.
This Court's resolving of a fact issue as a matter
of law brings to mind similar decisions of this Court in
previous cases brought under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act and the Federal Safety Appliance Act. We
invite a comparison with the first opinion in Pauly v.

McCarthy et al., 109 Utah 398, 166 P. 2d 501, 508, wherein the Court held that the passing track at Chacra was
not a place to work. This Court will recall the evidence
that trains with hotboxes proceeded onto the passing
track at Chacra not only to allow other trains to pass
along the main line track, but to make temporary repairs.
The evidence was that plaintiff in dismounting from the
rear car of his train at night, stepped off a trestle to the
creek bed below and was injured. This Court held, and
we quote:
"We conclude that under the evidence the
passing tracks at Chacra were not contemplated
as a place for work but must be considered as
one with all the rest of the road in the matter of
making emergency adjustments or repairs; that
using the passing tracks for such repairs was for
convenience only in not holding up traffic and not
because by custom, designation or contemplation
a place of work; that for reasons more fully set
out hereunder, under the evidence this was not
a jury question."
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Yet, the Supren1e Court of the United States at 67 S. Ct.
962 reversed, holding that whether or not the passing
track at Chacra was a place of work was at least a jury
question.

'y

:Jir. Justice
olfe, in his dissent in the case of
Coray u. Sonthern Pac. Co., 112 Utah 166, 185 P. 2d 963,
970, had this to say about the reversal of the Pauly case
by the United States Supreme Court:
"'Ve thought that to hold the entire shoulder
of the railroad as a place to work regardless of
any functions, frequent or otherwise, to be performed there, might require railroads to spend
millions of dollars in widening the shoulders on
every cut and fill so that an employee might safely
drop off without first looking. F:or if there was
a duty to build a flooring over a bridge at a passing track where an employee might by chance be
required to make repairs in order to prevent an
employee not exercising proper care from going
down through the bridge, there would be a similar
duty to widen every fill so as to prevent an employee, carelessly alighting, from sliding down the
side of a fill where the sides were steep.
"vVhile we have not had the benefit of an
opinion of the United States Supreme Court as to
the reasons for its decision, we may assume that it
concluded from the evidence that in law the passing track was a place to work, or at least that,
under the evidence, the passing track was a place
to work was for the jury."
In the case at bar reasons other than those relating
to a determination of negligence have again been used
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by this Court. It makes the astounding argument that
if it were necessary for the defendant to use sufficient
equipment it might eliminate manual labor on this job
and deprive families of a livelihood. This should have
nothing to do with a determination of plaintiff's right
of recovery.
This reasoning of the Court is absolutely contrary
to the established interpretation of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. In Boston & M. R. R. v. Meech, 156 F.
2d 109, 111, the Court held that where further precautions
could be taken for the safety of employees an evidentiary
basis of negligence was established. The Court stated:
"From the foregoing, it is clear that although
some precautions were taken for the decedent's
safety, further precautions were possible, and
from this it follows, as we read the decisions cited
above, that there was an 'evidentiary basis' for
submitting the issue of the defendant's causal
negligence to the jury, and hence that our 'function is exhausted.'"
Also see Boston & M. R. R. v. Kyle, 156 F. 2d 112.
Where a safer method of procedure could have been followed in doing the work, the Court held there was an evidentiary basis for a finding of negligence.
This Court took a fact question from the jury in the
case of Wilkerson v. McCarthy et al., 112 Utah 300, 187 P.
2d 188, 194. In that case the question arose as to whether
by custom and usage a plank across a wheel pit, surrounded on three sides by chains, was a walkway. In
spite of evidence that for three months prior to the acci-
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dent switch1nen had used the plank as a walkway, swinging around the posts and inside the enclosure of the
chains, this Court weighed disputed questions of fact and
held, and we quote:
•· An exa1nination of this evidence shows the
witness could identify two switchmen who crossed
the plank during the three nwnths period, but it is
entirely lacking in those elements necessary to
show acceptance of a custmn or practice by acquiescence. The use by employees other than the two
is confused between the times before and the times
after the installation of the safety chains."
And again, at p. 195 :
"It must be conceded that if dependents knew
or were charged with knowledge that switchmen
and other workmen generally in the yard were
habitually using the plank as a walkway in the
manner claimed by plaintiff, then the safety enclosure might be entirely inadequate, and a jury
question would have been presented on the condition of the board and the adequacy of the enclosure."
The Supreme Court of the United States again was
forced to remind this Court that disputed questions of
fact and inferences therefrom are peculiarly questions
for the jury, and after quoting the last aforementioned
portion of this Court's opinion, stated (69 S. Ct. 413,
-!17) :
"We agree with this last quoted statement of
the Utah court, and since there was evidence to
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support a jury finding that employees generally
had habitually used the board as a walkway, it was
error for the trial judge to direct a verdict in
favor of respondent."
In the case at bar this Court has held that there is no
disputed question of fact concerning the likelihood of
injury from over straining in icing diners. This decision
assurnes the very fact which was in dispute in the case
and about which there was controversial evidence. It
assumes as an absolute proposition of fact that the railroad could not have reasonably anticipated or foreseen
the likelihood of injury to any of its employees from the
nature of the task of icing diners and the severity of the
strain involved in performing that task, that the task
was not difficult to perform and did not involve the likelihood of overexertion. This Court is again in the identical position it occupied in deciding disputed questions of
fact as matter of law in the Pauly and Wilkerson cases.
This Court has set up as the sole standard of care
to which the railroad company must comply safeguarding
against foreseeable injury to "ordinary" employees. As
we have heretofore pointed out, the "ordinary" individual
thusly defined would be more accurately described as
the perfect individual, that is, the strong, husky youth
with no physical deficiency or inadequacies whatsoever.
This Court is blinded to the realism of fact that all employees are not perfect or even "ordinary." Some may
be 5 feet 7 inchs in height and weighing 127 pounds, as
was one of the witnesses. Some may have suffered from
the ravages of age and hardening of the arteries. Some
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may haYe congenital weakne~~e::;; which may ultimately
produce hernia~ fr01n oyerstrain. Yet these individuals,
'vhen subjected to the usual and ordinary type of stress
and strain in the perfor1nance of their labor, would suffer
no injury, but if confronted with the strenuous and burdensonle task of icing three diners, carrying llj2 tons of
ice up a 15 foot ladded over a period of 2¥2 hours, may
suffer injury, and the jury could have found and did
find that plaintiff was among the class of individuals
wherein there was and would be a likelihood of some injury in the assigning of hin1 to this task, especially in
view of the fact that he was not hardened to the task but
had been perfonning lighter work for some period of time
prior to his injuries. Consider in this connection the
statement made by ?\Ir. Justice Wade in his concurring
opinion in Bennett 1.:. Pilot Products Co., Inc., 235 P. 2d
525, 528:

··It see1ns clear, however, that if respondent
had reason to believe that one out of every thousand of its owners would be harmed as plaintiff
was by the use of its products, then it could foresee, and therefore must reasonably anticipate that
such would be the result. :Many negligently maintained dangerous instrumentalities actually harm
less than one person in a thousand of those who
come in contact with the1n. To hold that such result could not be reasonably anticipated is to give
to such expression a meaning not ordinarily intended and will lead to confusion rather than clear
thinking."
Although \Ve realize the court has held otherwise,
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let us assume for the purpose of argument that a duty
was owed by defendant to furnish sufficient equipment
for the task of icing diners and that said duty was violated in not furnishing sufficient equipment. The only
remaining question is that of proximate cause. This
Court has likewise held as matter of law that strenuous
overexertion was not a proximate cause of plaintiff's
injuries. It has so held in spite of positive medical testimony that overstraining was the precipitating, contributing cause of his injuries. Let us consider this holding
in the light of the Act which reads in part as follows (45
U.S.C.A., Sec. 51) :
"Every common carrier * * * shall be liable
in damages * * * for * * * injuries * * * resulting
in whole or in part from * * * insufficiency, due to
its negligence, in its * * * machinery, * * * or other
equipment."
Common law principles of proximate cause are modified and altered by abolition of contributory negligence
as a bar to recovery, and by substitution of the concept
of multiplicity of causes.
This Court has suggested that plaintiff would not
have been injured were it not for his rheumatic heart.
It has held as a matter of law that the rheumatic heart
was the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.
We wonder what characterization this Court would
attach to the overexertion to which plaintiff was subjected. Is this merely "a non-negligent condition" as was
· suggested by this Court in its erroneous opinion in the
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ca:se of Coray v. Sollfhcru Pucit'ic Co. 11:2 Utah 166 185
.
'
'
P. :2d 963, or is thi~ disting-uishable as a cause "in a philosophical sense'' rather than .. in a leg-al sense" as was
sug-g-ested by this Court in the same case~
\Ye call attention to the languag-e of the United
State:s Suprenw Court in the case of Coray v. Southern
Pacific Co., 335 U.S. 520, 69 S. Ct. 275, 277, 93 L. Ed. 208,
where the Court stated :
'"The languag-e selected by Cong-ress to fix
liability in cases of this kind is simple and direct.
Consideration of its meaning by the introduction
of dialetical subtleties can serve no useful interpretative purpose. The statute declares that railroads shall be responsible for their ernployees'
deaths 'resulting in whole or in part' from defective appliances such as were here maintained.
-!5 L".S.C. Sec. 51, 45 U.S.C.A. Sec. 51. And to
make its purpose crystal clear, Congress has also
provided that 'no such employee * * * shall be held
to have been guilty of contributory neg-lig-ence in
any case' where a violation of the Safety Appliance Act, such as the one here, 'contributed to the
* * * death of such employee.' 45 U.S.C. Sec. 53,
45 U.S.C.A. Sec. 53. Congress has thus for its
own reasons imposed extraordinary safety obligations upon railroads and has commanded that if
a breach of these obligations contributes in part
to an employee's death, the railroad must pay
damages. These air-brakes were defective; for
this reason alone the train suddenly and unexpectedly stopped; a motor track car following at
about the same rate of speed and operated by an
employee looking in another direction crashed into
the train; all of these circumstances were insepar-
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ably related to one another in time and space.
The jury could have found that decedent's death
resulted from any or all of the foregoing circumstances."
In a case where a multiplicity of causes and conditions contributed to cause plaintiff's injuries, this Court
has singled out plaintiff's physical condition and labeled
it sole proximate cause. It has thereby in effect judicially
legislated the words "in whole or in part" out of the
act.
If this Court's opinion is allowed to stand and becmne a precedent in this state it will mean that any railroad workman suffering from a straining injury will be
defeated simply because he had an "undiscoverable physical eccentricity," without which he would not have suffered injury. The reasoning of this Court's opinion would.
clearly have defeated plaintiff in Stewart v. Baltimore &
0. R. Co., 137 F'. 2d 527, 529, where decedent had an undiscoverable physical weakness, to wit: a coronary heart,
injured frmn overstraining, but the Court rightly held
"Over-exertion resulting in serious casualties is something which can as well be foreseen as many other occurrences and is something which an employer may be
thought bound to take all reasonable steps to prevent."
Such reasoning would have defeated plaintiff in Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Kerrick, 178 Ky. 486, 199 S.W. 44,
where plaintiff incurred a hernia from straining. Likewise it would have defeated plaintiff in the case of Duffy
v. Union Pacific R. Co., 218 P. 2d 1080.
Countless cases and countless courts have allowed
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plaintiffs under the Federal En1ployers' Liability Act to
rE'('over for straining injurie8. Ruptured intervertebral
disks, spondylolisthesis, inguinal hernia, incisional hernia, ruptured blood ve8sel and coronary thrornbosis cases
are being tried daily in our courts. Almost without exception these are ra8es of latent undiscoverable weaknesses without which injuries would not have occurred,
and where the injury is caused in whole or in part from
overexertion either as a result of insufficient equipment
or as a result of insufficient help, or both. Many of these
cases are cited in plaintiff's original brief.
~\nalogous cases where recovery has not been allowed
are distinguishable. Among others, this Court has cited
Owen v. Rochester-Penfield Bus Co., 103 N.Y.S. 2d 137,
and Louis'Uille & N. R. Co. v. Willhite, 300 Ky. 75, 187
S.\Y. 2d 1010.
..As we pointed out in our original brief, these are
cases decided pursuant to the doctrine of assumption of
risk. Under this doctrine a man assumes the natural,
ordinary anticipated risks of his employment. Risks of
overexertion from insufficiency of equipment were the
very kind of risks assumed. There was no recovery at
common law for in~ufficiency of equipment. This is a
duty imposed by statute, and safeguarded by statutory
abolition of the doctrine of assumption of risk. We again
cite 45 U.S.C.A., Sec. 54:
"That in any action brought against any comInon carrier under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this chapter to recover damages for injuries to, or the death of, any of its employees,
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such employee shall not be held to have assumed
the risks of his employment in any case where such
injury or death resulted in whole or in part from
the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or
employees of such carrier; * * *."
Likewise, the Tiller case, supra, ( 63 S. Ct. 444, 451)
where it was said:
"The doctrine of assumption of risk cannot
be 'abolished in toto' and still remain in partial
existence as the court below suggests. The theory
that a servant is completely barred from recovery
for injury resulting from his master's negligence,
which legislatures have sought to eliminate in all
its various forms of contributory negligence, the
fellow ser;vant rule, and assumption of risk, must
not, contrary to the will of Congress, be allowed
recrudescence under any other label in the common law lexicon* * *."
This Courts calls it by another name, non-negligence, but
the doctrine of assumption of risk cannot thus easily
be disguised. It has been resurrected from the scrap heap
of the law to again defeat a plaintiff's cause.
In conclusion may we urge the following propositions:
1. This Court has erroneously concluded that there
was no likelihood of injury to railroad coach cleaners
from overexertion even though the evidence and inferences favorable to plaintiff lead to a contrary conclusion, and even though the jury and trial judge came to a
contrary conclusion.
2. This Court has erroneously concluded that the
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words "in whole or in part'' have no 1neaning in the
statute, are mere verbiage, and has judicially excluded
workmen with so-called physical eccentricities, who break
down under strain and overexertion, from the benefits
of the act.
3. This Court has erroneously disregarded the statutory and t:"nited States Supreme Court decisional law
in holding that plaintiff assumed the risks of overexertion
incident to his employment and has labeled assumption
of risk as non-negligence.
Xever before has this Court, even in the Pauly,
Wilkerson and Coray cases, supra, so clearly disregarded
the meaning and philosophy of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons herein set forth, we submit that
error was committed by the Court in reversing and dismissing the cause of plaintiff and in setting aside a jury
verdict in his favor.
Respectfully submitted,
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, BLACK,
ROBERTS & BLACK
WAYNE L. BLACK
Attorneys for Respondent
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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